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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In Thc: Mattzr of
CURTIS SUBA, 8 1-A-5059,
Petitioner,
-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 0 1-08-ST8873 Index No. 2382-08
Appearances :

Curtis Suba
Inmate No. 8 1-A-5059
Petitioner, Pro Se
Coxsackie Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 200
Route 9W
West Coxsackie, New York 12051
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Shoshanah V. Asnis, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

DECISION and JUDGMENT
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
The petitioner, an inmate at Coxsackie Correctional Facility, has commenced the
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination by respondent New York State
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Board of Parole denying his request for discretionary release. Respondent opposes the
petition seeking its dismissal.
Currently, the petitioner is serving an indeterminate prison sentence of 15 years to life
upon a plea of guilty to Murder in the second degree. The underlying offense that occurred
in 1980 involved the petitioner, in concert with others, robbing a victim at knife-point and
then stabbing the victim to death. The petitioner was approximately 20 years old at the time
he committed the underlying offense.

On July 18, 2007, the petitioner appeared for the seventh time before the Parole
Board, having served almost 27 years in prison. The petitioner noted during the interview
that he had a prior criminal record, including a conviction for arson. He also acknowledged
that he had stabbed the victim and, prior to the underlying crime, had been taking part in
robberies in the area where the crime occurred.
In addition to discussing the underlying crime, the petitioner discussed with the Parole
Board his proposed plans upon release. The Parole Board noted its concern regarding the
petitioner’s admitted drug use and the fact that he had only been drug free for less than a
year. The petitioner informed the Parole Board that he hoped, upon ulcase, to be admitted
to an inpatient drug program to help with his adjustment into society after such a long period
of incarceration. If that does not work, the petitioner explained that his parents will let him
live with them while he gets some much needed education. Also, the petitioner discussed his
positive involvement in the Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatmmt Progi*aiii. ‘Ihc. l’arole
Board noted that the petitioner had not had a Tier I1 ticket since 2004. The Parole B o d al:+l
afiorded the petitioner an opportunity to inform it of any other matters he thought important
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to his application for discretionary release.
Subsequently, the Parole Board denied the petitioner’s application for discretionary
*

release, holding him for 24 months. That denial provided:
“You continue to serve a 15 year to life term for murder in the
2”d degree. You and others stabbed a male victim to death
during an apparent robbery. The crime both continued and
escalated your previous pattern of criminal conduct which dated
back to the 1970’s. At interview you admitted your history of
drug abuse in the community. The panel remains concerned
about your drug abuse as your disciplinary history while
incarcerated demonstrates repeated instances of drug use over
the years. Any relapse on your part would subject the
community to a risk of harm. Therefore, while the panel notes
your extensive incarceration the panel concludes that if
release[d] at this time there exists a reasonable probability that
you will not live and remain at liberty without further violating
the welfare and safety of the community and would so deprecate
the severity of the offense as to undermine respect for the law.
Prior to your next appearance date, continue to program as
recommended and maintain appropriate discipline by refraining
from disciplinary infractions” (Parole Board Release Decision
Notice [dated 7-23-07], Answer, Exhibit F).
The petitioner administratively appealed the parole determination, but no decision was
issued regarding that appeal. Petitioner then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding
for review of that determination.’ In this proceeding, petitioner aigues, inter alia, that Parole
Board’s determination should be annulled because in reaching it the Parole Board failed to
consider (1) that the petitioner has already served time way in excess of his minimum

‘When, such as here, a determination regarding an administrative appeal is not
timely issued, a petitioner’s administrative remedies are deemed exhausted (see 9
NYCRR 8006.4 [c]; Matter of Grune v New York State Bd. of Parole, 3 1 AD3d 919,919
[3d Dept 20061).
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sentence; (2) the petitioner’s exemplary institutional programming and strong community
support; (3) the petitioner’s acceptable post-release plans; (4) the sentencing minutes; and

(5) the petitioner’s equal protection rights.
Executive Law

9 259-i (2) (c), in relevant part, provides that the following factors

shall bc cvrisidered by the Board in making a decision regarding discretionary parole release:
“(i) the institutional record including program goals and
accomplishments,academic achievements, vocational education,
training or work assignments, therapy and interpersonal
relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as
a participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release plans
including community resources, employment, education and
training and support services available to the inmate; (iv) any
deportation order issued by the federal government against the
inmate while in the custody of the department of correctional
services . . . ; and (v) any statement made to the board by the
crime victim or the victim’s representative . . .”
Further, where, such as here, a petitioner’s minimum period of imprisonment was not fixed
pursuant to the provisions of Executive Law 0 2594 (I), but rather by the sentencing Court,
the Board must also consider the following factors from Executive Law

6 2594 (1) (a)

(emphasis supplied):
“(i) the seri0usnt.s of the offense with due cumideration w the
type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the
sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney for the
inmate, the presentence probation report as well as
consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and
activities following arrest and prior to confinement; and (ii)
prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of
offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement. . . . ” (see a h Mattcr
of Santos v New York State Div. of Parole, 234 AD2d 840,840
[3d Dept 19961).
-it is well settled that parole decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so
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long as the statutory requirements set forth [above] are met” (Matter of Turner v Dennison,
24 AD3d 1074,1074 [3d Dept 20051; see Matter of Mendez v New York State Bd. of Parole,
20 AD3d 742, 742 [3d Dept 20051). Moreover, “[jludicial intervention is warranted only
when there is a ‘showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety”’ (Matter of Silmon v
Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000], quoting ?I.;!IIL-I.

I<tiyhl: i

4~mir id, \I;I~L, Bd. ofparole,

50NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; see 2l,i!i~~rL L l . ~ i - i . L i ~ \: i NL,~!
i ~ ! 1’1d,

\{:ric.

l4tl.

I ? i r o I ~ 20
~ , AD3d

75 1,752 [3d Dept 20051, lv dismissed 6 NY3d 74 1; Matter of Farid v Travis, 17 AD3d 754,
754 [3d Dept 20051, lv dismissed 5 NY3d 782).
Here, a review of the record establishes that the Parole Board, except for one notable
exception referred to below, considered the relevant statutory factors in exercising its
discretion to deny petitioner parole (see Matter of Abascal v New York State Bd. of Parole,
23 AD3d 740,74 1 [3d Dept 20051). The Parole Board may properly consider the seriousness

of the underlying crime, which in this instance is murder in the second degree, and the Board
is “not required to give equal weight to the statutory factors it considered in reaching its
discretionary determination” (hldwi ui 1 L

G ~ ~ I -+M h
~

w h ’ d SLJLC:Div. of Parole, 21 AD3d

1174, 1175 [3d Dept 20051). Borh the inraview irari3Cript and thc rccurJ bcfore the Parole
Board demonstrate that the Board also considered, inter alia, the petitioner’s institutional
achievements, his disciplinary record, post-release plans, his institutional adjustment and the
pre-sentence report

(see Matter of Watford v Travis,

16 AD3d 850, 851 [3d Dept 20051).

Notably, the Parole Board discussed at length with the petitioner his drug use history. In
addition, the Parole Board gave the petitioner an opportunity to highlight or discuss any
matter he felt warranted the Board’s attention (see Matter of Serna v New York State Div.
5
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of Parole, 279 AD2d 684,684-685 [3d Dept 20011). Thus, the record does not substantiate
the petitioner’s claim that the Board only considered the seriousness of the underlying crime
in denying his application for discretionary release.
In addition, in the Matter of Freeman v New York State Div. of Parole (2 1 AD3d 1 174
[3d Dept 2005]), the Third Department expressly rejected the argument that an inmate was
deprived of due process because “the Board failed to indicate areas in which petitioner fell
short of qualifying for parole” (3.at 1 175). That Court explained: “‘Executive Law 8 2594
does not create an entitlement to release on parole and therefore does not create interests
entitled to due process protection’” (d,
quoting Paunetto v Hammock, 5 16 F Supp 1367,
1367-1368 [ 19813; see Matter of Russo, 50 NY2d at 75-76). Moreover, the Court is not
persuaded by the “petitioner’s equal protection claim alleging that the Board treated him
differently from other inmates” who have also appeared before it (Matter of Valderrama v
Travis, 19 AD3d 904,905 [3d Dept 20051). “Inasmuch as the Board’s ruling in this instance
bears a rational relationship to the legitimate objective of community safety and respect for
the law,” that claim must be dismissed (A).
Turnkg

LO the

Liilure of the Parole Board to consider the sentencing minutes, the

Court is mindful of cases which have vacated parole determinations where the Parole Board
failed to consider the inmate’s sentencing minutes (see Matter of McLaurin v New York
State Board of Parole, 27 AD3d 565 [2ndDept., 20061, lv to appeal denied 7 NY3d 708;
Matter of Standley v New York State Division of Parole, 34 AD3d 1169 [3rdDept., 20061;
and Matter of Love11 v New York State Division of Parole, 40 AD3d 1166 [3rdDept., 20071).
6
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In this instance, the respondent has submitted a document dated August 8, 2008 from
Maureen O’Connell, County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of Nassau County, in
which Ms. O’Connell certifies that the minutes of petitioner’s sentencing on October 16,

1981 cannot be located after a thorough search.
The Court is thus confronted with a situation where the Division of Parole has failed
in its obligation, apparently over a substantial number of years, to obtain a copy of the
petitioner’s sentencing minutes. What renders the situation all the more egregious is that the
sentencing minutes are no longer available and can not be obtained. In the Court’s view the
determination of the Parole Board was procedurally flawed in that it did not consider the
sentencing minutes; and was not informed that the sentencing minutes are no longer
available. The Court finds that the matter should be remanded to the Parole Board for a de

novo parole interview. The Parole Board should be advised of the foregoing. It should
make a finding with regard to whether the sentencing minutes are no longer available and can
not be obtained. In the event that the Parole Board finds that the sentencing minutes are no
longer available and can not be obtained, then it should make a separate finding, if it be the

case, that there is no evidence in the record which indicates that the sentencing judge made

a sentencing recommendation adverse to the petitioner.
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and finds them to be
without merit.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is granted to the extent
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that the matter be and hereby is remanded to the Parole Board for a de nuvu parole interview
in keeping with this decision.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are
returned to the attorney for the Respondent who is directed to enter this
Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry.

n

ENTER
Dated:
George B. Ceresia, Jr.
Papers Considered:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Order to Show Cause signed April 23,2008;
Petition verified March 13, 2008, with accompanying Exhibits A-J;
Answer verified August 18,2008, with accompanying Exhibits A-M;
Affirmation of Shoshanah V. Asnis, Esq., affirmed August 18,2008.
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